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TOTALITARIANISM IN ROMANIA

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IV. FROM AUTHORITARIANISM TO TOTALITARIANISM

  • Although the Germans had promised to observe the King's request - to withdraw their army from Romania peacefully - the German air force and troops in the neighbourhood of Bucharest attacked the capital, causing material damage. As a result, the government declared war against Germany, at the same time asking the allies to bomb troops concentrations of the enemy in the area of the capital city.

  • Having turned its arms against Germany the government received from the Russians confirmation of the armistice conditions previously discussed; among other things the observance of a free zone for the Romanian government to function - a necessary condition for the Romanian state to function as an independent entity. The Romanian delegation was received in Moscow only on 10th September 1944 when the text of the armistice convention had already been worked out and the Red Army was already controlling the whole country. Under the circumstances of total Anglo-American neutrality the Russians withdrew their promise with regard to a free zone and set the Romanian government the task of maintaining the occupation army. They claimed war damages of 300 millions dollars payable in the course of 6 years. The Romanians demanded the inclusion of an article stipulating the withdrawal of the Russian troops when the war was over, but the Russians opposed this. The request to recognize the state as a co-belligerent country was not accepted either, although it was stipulated that Romania had taken part in the war with 12 divisions; in reality the number amounted to 20.

  • The application of the armistice convention was given to an "Allied Control Commission", in fact a Soviet commission in which Anglo-American representatives were simple puppets, not having even the right of travelling through the country without the approval of the Soviet authorities.

  • In 1944 in a discussion with Tito, Stalin had declared that "this war is not like the ones in the past; the one who occupies a territory also imposes his own social system".

  • After 11 months of hesitation the western recognized Petru Groza's government, which had been imposed by force by the Russians and then signed the peace treaty with Romania (February 1947). This treaty not only imposed even more difficult conditions on the country than those stipulated in the armistice convention, but it also legalized the Soviet military presence on the Romanian territory, without stipulating any term for its withdrawal.

  • As soon as the peace treaty with Soviet Union was signed, the east-European communist parties went on to the physical liquidation of the opposition. In Hungary and Bulgaria the arrest of the leaders of the agrarian parties, equivalents to the National Tsaranist Party in Romania, had started as early as the spring. Everywhere, from the Elbe to the Vistula and the Danube, the seizure of power and the destruction of the old world were carried out by terror and violence under the direct protection of the occupation troops and before the eyes of the western observers.

  • The Red Army "had liberated" the east-European countries by an accident of history which had not been predictable before the war. But once present in these countries, it played an important role in the setting up of the communist regimes. Without these troops, the local communists would have remained peripheral political forces. From this point of view, the pattern of conquest the power by the Romanian communists, fewer than 1,000 in 1944, perfectly fits the general east-European pattern.

  • The communist Party had initially supported the policy of the coalition governments, gradually increasing its influence and weight until, under Soviet protection and by intimidation, it succeeded in removing its rivals and remaining the only one in power.

  • At the same time the party practiced a demagogical reformism which attracted some popular support both among the peasants and among the workers.

  • Like in the other east-European countries the communists had to face a confused and divided opposition which offered only weak resistance.

  • The only political party which could not be internally undermined was the National Tsaranist Party - which accounts for the fury with which it was attacked and its leaders exterminated.

  • Under the protection of the Red Army and with the help of skillfully maintained propaganda, the ranks of the Communist party continuously increased. This was also fed by the hopes for a better life by some people and the opportunism of the others. Above all, the representatives of the minorities - Hungarians and Jews- who had been persecuted before and who considered themselves entitled to play an important role in political life, joined the Communist Party. The ethnic structure of the party, especially of the leading staff, had continued for a long time to be non-Romanian in spite of waves of the iron-guardists received into the party as a result of the agreement between the two parties in November 1944 and August 1945. In absolute figures the party increased from under 1,000 members in 1944 to 35,000 in March 1945, 256,863 in October 1945, 717,490 in June 1946 and 803,831 in 1947.

  • For tactical reasons Moscow put Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej to the forefront, being elected prime-secretary in November 1945. The real power and influence in the party remained further in the hands of the "Moscovites" (Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, Emil Bodnaras, Iosif Chisinevski, Leonte Rautu). The internal faction (Dej, Lucretiu Patrascanu, Chivu Stoica, Gheorghe Apostol) enjoyed less influence in the eyes of Stalin. This was not an accidental reaction; both Dej and Patrascanu had made some declarations of a nature to rouse suspicion in Moscow. The former had published a brochure "A political policy", unusual for a communist by its title: the latter had declared in Cluj in 1945 that before being a communist he thought himself a Romanian.

  • Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej quickly realised the tactical mistake he had made and after 1945 he adopted a quiet Stalinist line which protected him against complications and under whose protection he could fight with the Moscovite faction and, in the end, come out victorious. Patrascanu, on the other hand, devoid of similar capacity for adaptation was continuously losing influence, being removed from the leadership of the party in the end (1948).

  • The road of the Communist Party to power started immediately after 23rd of August 1944, favoured by Iuliu Maniu's hesitation to form a coalition government proposed by the king. As a result the latter had to give up the idea of a civil government and entrusted the power to General Constantin Sanatescu, with Lucretiu Patrascanu as temporary Minister of Justice, an important position which allowed him to begin, in September 1944, the purging of the army and state machinery by removing non-communist elements. Also in September the so-called People's Courts started to work.

  • Sanatescu's government did not survive more than two months. It was forced to rule under totally unnatural circumstances. The Constitution of 1923 had really come into force again but only in theory. In reality Moldova was ruled directly by the Soviet army. Everywhere it appointed as prefects and officials communists or communist-supporters. Soviet censorship had been established on 12th of September all over the country and each printed work needed a preliminary licence before being published. On 12th October the communists and the social-democrats left the Bloc of Democratic parties on their own initiative and made up the National Democratic Front together with other left wing groups. On 16th October the communist and social-democrat ministers resigned from the government in order to cause its fall, in the hope of immediately taking over power. The new government was also formed by general Sanatescu but the participation of the communists and their collaborators was enlarged.

  • This ministerial reorganization did not put an end to unrest which went on with increasing intensity so that the second Sanatescu's government lasted only until 6th December, when the king, refusing to appoint another prime-minister representing the National Democratic Front, appointed general Nicolae Radescu, a famous antifascist who had spent 2 years in a concentration camp, to form the government.

  • This government did not functioning normally either. On 13th November, on the pretext of keeping order, the Russians took over the direct administration of North Transylvania making use of this delicate problem to put pressure upon the king. In January 1945 the deportation of Transylvanian Saxons and Swabians to Russia had been started.

  • After continuous pressure, on 6th March 1945, the Soviets succeeded in imposing on the king its candidate to the post of prime-minister: Petru Groza.

  • The North Transylvanian administration was indeed given back to the Romanians, but the whole of Groza's policy was rapidly directed towards the communization of the country:

    • A chaotic agrarian reform was adopted on 23rd March.

    • A law concerning the purge of the state machinery was adopted on 30th March.

    • A camp for political prisoners was set up in Caracal, initially to be filled with iron-guardists, then with opponents of all kinds.

    • The people's courts intensified their activity.

    • During the summer there appeared mixed Romanian-Soviet companies, sovroms, a masked form of robbing the Romanian economy of resources by the Russians.

  • Under these circumstances, the king decided to ask for the resignation of Groza's government, wanting to replace it with a really representative one. The Anglo-Americans had not recognized Groza's government due to the fact that it did not represent the majority of the population but the communists and its allies.

  • As a result of the refusal of the government to resign, an illegal refusal since the king had the constitutional right to appoint and dismiss the prime-minister, King Mihai I went on a "royal strike" refusing to sign the decrees and laws presented by the government to be approved. The government continued its activity undisturbed, insensitive to the legal or constitutional arguments as it knew it had the support of the occupation army and Moscow.

  • The Anglo-American allies recognized Groza's government in February 1946 and, legitimized and given a free hand, the government went on immediately to apply the measures meant to put an end to any kind of opposition towards the communization of the country: the trial and execution of marshal Antonescu, the adoption of a new election law, the suppressing of the Senate. In the meantime there were preparations for parliamentary elections under the circumstances of fear and pressure. The elections took place on 19th November 1946 and made the National Democratic Front come out victorious. It "won" 79.86 per cent of the votes, although all the western observers had pointed out that victory had gone to Maniu and Bratianu, the leaders of "historic parties" with at least three quarters of the vote.
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