THE BACKGROUND TO NAZISM
UNIFICATION AND INDUSTRIALISATION

Conventional interpretations of fascism often portray it as the product of a "special path" of national development in Germany and Italy that predated the First World War. Nazism, it is argued, arose because: "the Germans have believed with a desperate conviction... that they have a divine mission."[Vermeil] A key role here is given to the "ideology of power and community" justified through "a unique Germanic-pagan prehistory."[Vermeil] This explanation would be plausible if the Nazi movement had been isolated or lain dead and buried after 1945. However, it was part of a European phenomenon stretching in time from the inter-war period until today. Clearly, while Nazism owes something to German history, it must have also shared many characteristics with other countries.

A more subtle approach has been to bracket Germany with a group of countries which together shared a system of "totalitarianism":

National Socialism represents the right-wing variant of modern totalitarianism, the ideological counterpart of Communism, or left-wing totalitarianism... The major reason why Germany and several other countries turned to totalitarianism resides in their failure to integrate traditional institutions with the requirements of modern industrial civilization."

In the nineteenth century Germany was dominated by two processes - the creation of the unified national state and industrialisation. The key moments in unification were the failed liberal nationalist revolution of 1848 and a series of wars between 1864 and 1870. During the latter period Germany amalgamated its separate states into one. Unification in turn became the springboard for large-scale industrialisation.

After 1815 the territory consisted of a Confederation of 38 states run mostly by autocratic Princes or Kings each of whom jealously guarded their sovereign independence. The revolution of 1848 aimed to merge these states into one national unit organised on a democratic basis. Leadership of the movement fell to an elected assembly at Frankfurt. The deputies there included 49 university professors, 157 magistrates, 118 higher civil servants, but not a single worker and just one peasant. Mindful of the way the French revolution had turned to Jacobinism, this thoroughly middle class crowd, while wanting national unity and democracy, were afraid to rouse the sort of mass action that might uproot the old ruling groups who resisted unification. Engels explained the dilemma of the 1848 Parliamentarians:

It is a peculiarity of the bourgeoisie, in contrast to all former ruling classes, that there is a turning point in its development after which every further expansion of its agencies of power, hence primarily of its capital, only tends to make it more and more unfit for political rule. "Behind the big bourgeois stand the proletarians." As the bourgeoisie develops its industry, commerce and means of communication it produces the proletariat... [and] begins to notice that its proletarian double is outgrowing it. From that moment on, it loses the strength required for exclusive political rule; it looks around for allies with whom to share its rule, or whom to cede the whole of its rule, as circumstances may require... These allies are all reactionary by nature. There is the monarchy with its army and its bureaucracy...

The Frankfurt parliamentarians feared that if the "mob" was stirred up to dispose of Kings and Princes it might turn on lesser property owners afterwards. Rather than go down this road they offered the King of Prussia the Crown of a united Germany, hoping he would provide the physical force to complete their project. The offer was contemptuously refused. Soon after the Frankfurt Parliament was easily dispersed and with it went the possibility of national unification on a bourgeois democratic basis.

Still Germany was unified. The means used were "blood and iron", in the words of its architect, the Prussian Chancellor Bismarck. In wars against the Denmark (1864), Austria (1866) and France (1870) a single state was forged under the hegemony of the Prussian King (now "Kaiser"). Thus was achieved the bourgeois goal of national unity without any real bourgeois democracy. The new political system did not allow the Parliament (Reichstag) to choose the government or Chancellor. It could only advise. Power, apparently, remained with feudal institutions - the monarchy and Junkers (aristocratic landowners from Eastern Prussia, the most economically backward area of the country).

In Germany the middle class preferred an alternative to physical confrontation with the traditional state, opting for cooperation and transformation from within. For its part, the Prussian state played along with the bourgeoisie and indeed encouraged it. Bismarck knew that industrial capitalism was vital if an army was to be built that was strong enough to forge a central European state under the noses of its jealous neighbours (Austria and France) and in the teeth of local particularism from German royal houses. For him the key issue was the common interest of exploiters: "for the security and advancement of the state, it is more useful to have a majority of those who represent property."

Even if it retained an archaic political appearance, the German state championed the creation of and industrial society. In Engels' words, the new Reich had "outgrown the old Prussian Junker-feudalism. In this way the very victories of the Prussian army shifted the entire basis of the Prussian state structure." The German industrialists may not have remade the state, but it fitted their needs. A German state inimical to their interests would have been an obstacle to development, but:

industrial development went ahead at a tumultuous pace... German steel production, roughly equivalent to that of France in 1880, exceeded its closest rival by almost four to one by 1910. Germany's coal output increased seven times over between 1870 and 1913, a period in which British coal production increased less than two and a half times.

Between 1860 and 1910 Germany's industrial output per head outstripped that of Britain, France and the USA. In just 12 years (to 1907) machine production increased by 160%, mining by 69% and metallurgy by 59%. Whereas 63% of the population lived in the countryside when Germany was unified, on the eve of the First World War 60% lived in towns.

This was not achieved in spite of the state, but with its assistance through measures such as:

freedom of movement for goods, capital and labor; freedom of enterprise from guild regulation; the 'emancipation of credit', favorable legal conditions for company formation; the metric system of weights and measures, a single currency and unified laws of exchange; a federal consular service and standardized postal and telegraphic communications; patent laws and the general codification of the commercial law...

These were rendered possible by the unification achieved by force of Prussian arms under Junker leadership.

Unlike the scenario painted by totalitarian theory, this was not a frustrated rising capitalism facing a "neutral force above the competing particular interests of party and class", but a partnership in which there was a division of labour. Bismarck admitted as much, describing the new system as an alliance of baronial landowners and industrialists - "the marriage of iron and rye" There were tensions. Bismarck resented attempts by the party of business (the National Liberals) to directly influence the state, a domain he reserved exclusively for his circle drawn from the Junker landowning class. In the end the bourgeoisie accepted a subordinate role in the political sphere in return for economic dominance and physical protection.

In this the state was no impartial arbiter between the various classes of German society. The commitment of the army to preservation of the system from the threat of the working class and its Social Democratic Party, was summed up by General von Einem, Minister of War: "I have hated the Social Democrats all of my life [and] waged the struggle against them with the purest conscience and from innermost conviction." Thus, "the very modernity" of the institutional framework created out of the unification settlement made "democratization" (or further liberalization) unnecessary." The position of the big business sector was put superbly by the industrial magnate Fritz Thyssen, who became an ardent supporter of Hitler:

an industrialist is always inclined to consider politics a kind of second string to his bow - the preparation for his own particular activity. In a well-ordered country, where the administration is sound, where taxes are reasonable, and the police well organised, he can afford to abstain from politics and devote himself entirely to business.

The roots of Nazism and the crisis that brought it to power therefore did not reside in a hybrid half-feudal society, but in a modern one. This does not mean German society was identical to other societies. Each has its own characteristics.

ORGANISED CAPITAL

One early development in Germany was the close collaboration of state and capital. In Britain, the world's first industrial power, the traditionally dominant landowners had initially seen commerce and industry as a useful source of revenue. This led to a policy of "mercantilism" where the state funded its operations by levying customs duties on foreign imports. Early British industry was hamstrung by the high cost of foreign raw materials and customs barriers both at home and abroad. Therefore the battle cry of the rising industrial bourgeoisie was laissez-faire and free trade - there should be minimal government intervention in economic affairs. The pursuance of "Manchesterism" from the 1840s onwards was highly successful and made Britain "the workshop of the world". Leaving nothing to chance the state bolstered its position by conquest of vast colonies (closely followed by France).

By the time German industry arrived to compete on international scene Britain had international economic hegemony. Far from resenting protectionism, many German industrialists (along with the Junkers who were fast becoming agricultural capitalists in their own right) rejected laissez-faire because they needed state support against competitors in the shape of tariff barriers. Not all sectors viewed protection in the same light. Successful export industries would come to reject the imposition of tariffs because other countries retaliated by introducing their own on German goods. This was not the predominant view, however, and the demand for protection was given added urgency by the "Great Depression" - a dip in world prices that lasted from 1873 to 1896. Thus in 1879 the German government introduced a series of protective tariffs so that: "From now on economic, domestic and foreign policy were completely dominated by the united of interest between agriculture, industry and the leaders of the state. Although the degree of collaboration between capital and the state may be disputed, the close integration of the two was one contributory factor in the triumph of Nazism in 1933 and continued to shape the regime's policies right through to 1945.

Another consequence of German industrialisation following Britain's was that its capital tended to be far more concentrated. British industry had begun in the 1760s with small production units and numerous entrepreneurs. Only gradually did competition whittle down numbers and increased the size of factories. Industrialising a century later Germany began with larger units leading to an "organisation of individual capitals and the 'organisation of capitalism' [which] was the most developed of any country by 1914." The electrical industry, which was virtually non-existent at the time of the 1882 census, had 107,000 workers in 1907 and was dominated by just two firms - AEG and Siemens-Halske. The town of Hamborn was dominated by three pits, employing 6,000, 11,000 and 14,000 miners respectively. In the financial sector Germany's nine giant banks wielded immense power by 1914, their involvement with industry linking many separate units together.

While the concentration of capital was characteristic of some sectors of the German economy, it is important to realise how uneven the situation was. For example, in 1907 the average number of workers per company was 164 in mining and 142 in metallurgy. At the opposite end the figures for transport, woodworking and clothing were 5, 4 and 2 respectively. This meant that in some sectors the middle class had been transformed into full capitalists. However, a substantial middle class (or petty bourgeoisie) remained. This also had an impact on the working class. There continued to be a mass of artisans, craftsmen and others still working in close proximity to their employers. The concentration of modern capitalism at the top of German society generated a fierce class antagonism, but the continuing existence of a broad middle class milieu should not be ignored.

By the twentieth century workers had achieved a scale of organisation unknown anywhere else. Founded in 1875, in its early days the Social Democratic Party was committed to revolutionary Marxism. By 1912 the party had won 35% of the vote making it by far the most popular party. It had at this time over 1 million members, with 11,000 of them on local councils and an estimated 100,000 working in its various offshoots or affiliated bodies (insurance institutions and so on). Workers' organisation was not limited to the political sphere for direct conflict between capital and labour took place in the factories and mines. The Free Trade Unions (ADGB) grew in membership even more dramatically than the SPD. Established by that Party, the ADGB's numbers rose from 237,000 in 1892 to 2.6 million in 1912. What lay behind this stormy development of the labour movement?

Firstly: "Compared to Great Britain and France, German industrialisation was the most rapid, giving workers the least time to adapt to the conditions and labour demands of the industrial system." The very success and scale of capitalist growth had created a political reaction among those the new industrialists sought to exploit. Secondly, much of the working class was politicised by its experience of an authoritarian state in a capitalist society. The sham of democracy was brought out sharply by the imposition of the Anti-Socialist Laws which operated between 1878 and 1890. It was no accident that their introduction virtually coincided with the protectionist moves of 1879. Both reflected the coming together of state and capital. Under the Anti-Socialist Laws 1,500 prison sentences were handed down and even after repeal repression did not stop. 1,244 years of prison were imposed on SPD members between 1890 and 1912. Such moves were welcomed by industrialists such as Alfred Krupp who told his employees: "Higher politics requires more time and a greater insight into conditions than are given to the workers... You will do nothing but damage if you try to interfere with the helm of the legal order." Whereas in 1789 France the democratic bourgeoisie mobilised the common people in its fight against the aristocracy, in Germany the situation was different.

[The] Labour movement had to concentrate all its energies on the attainment of democracy in a bitter struggle against the combined forces of the Emperor, the landed aristocracy (with its offspring, the Prussian Army) and... capitalist interests.

So German Marxism was closely identified with the struggle for parliamentary democracy. On the other side was a ruling class committed to opposing such democracy. This identification of the working class movement with democratic rights, and of capitalism with denial of such rights, would play a key role in the rise of Nazism.

Class antagonisms had an impact on the German middle class. Historically this class has had the potential to play a variety of political roles, from far left to far right. In the English and French revolutions it formed the most radical wings in Cromwell's New Model Army and the Jacobin clubs. In 1930s Germany it would tend to support Nazism. Such volatility arises from its position between the two key social classes. The middle class can identify with the workers, because it too lacks the wealth and privilege of the capitalists, falls into debt with banks, or is a victim of big capital in the unequal competition to survive. However, there can be another influence. The middle class can also identify with the capitalist class because both own property (even if the disparity in size of property is great) and it sees itself as superior to the working class in wealth and education.

In late nineteenth century Europe the middle class often found itself roughly equidistant from both capitalists and workers, forming the backbone of liberalism - the middle road. In Germany such an option barely existed. The intensity of class struggle and the structure of the state forced a choice between the two hostile armies. The right-wing Conservative Party won over large numbers of middle class supporters from the ailing liberal parties over the question of protection in 1879. It skilfully diverted attention from the clash between big capital and the middle class by using anti-Semitic rhetoric. The eventual result was an almost complete collapse of the "middle road" in politics.

ANTI-SEMITISM AND WAR

Two other aspects are often portrayed as especially German traits and independent factors in their own right - anti-Semitism and the drive to war. Anti-semitism is sometimes portrayed as a non-class or perhaps especially middle class phenomenon. In fact it was prevalent at the very summit of society. In 1901, for example, Kaiser Wilhelm II waxed lyrical about the "massive primeval Aryan-Germanic feeling which lay slumbering within me" He thought: "our aim must certainly be firmly to exclude Jewish influence..." and was "completely under the spell" of Houston Chamberlain. As a leading anti-semite the latter wrote to Hitler in 1923: "With one blow you have transformed the state of my soul. That Germany, in the hour of her greatest need, brings forth a Hitler - that is proof of her vitality..."

Significantly, organised mass anti-semitism began in 1878, the very same year as the passing of the Anti-Socialist Law, with the formation of Stöcker's Christian Social Party. A year later it was joined by the League of Anti-Semites and in 1880 by the Social Reich Party and German Reform Party. All made anti-semitism their key policy. However, anti-semitism was not the exclusive property of one-issue groups. The much bigger Conservative Party used it to build up influence amongst the middle class. At a time when German industrialists and Junkers were pushing for state curtailment of competition through protectionist measures it suited them to attack Jewish businessmen who were portrayed as representatives of free market capitalism.

The idea that the drive to war was some exceptional German trait is false. It should not be forgotten that in the nineteenth century Germany's future foes, with political systems ranging from British liberal democracy, to French republicanism and Russian autocracy, had been conquering whole continents by force of arms. Germany's position - a population of 65 million, 16% of world industrial output, but only 12 million people in its colonies contrasts with that of the British capitalism. With a domestic population of 45 million it had 14% of world industry and an Empire of 394 million.

Internal social factors also played a part in the German state's calculations. In its fight against the rise of Social Democracy the government wanted to "consolidate the position of the ruling classes with a successful imperialist foreign policy [since] war would resolve growing social tensions." Even this was not peculiarly German.

The First World War cost 13 million lives and left another 36 million wounded. For Germany this meant 1.7 million dead and 4.2 million wounded. War caused a split in the SPD. The majority supported the government, a minority opposed. However, the nature of German war aims was exposed by the vicious Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which the German military imposed on the newly formed Russian Soviet state in early 1918. This cost the Bolshevik government 26% of its population, one third of its townspeople, 28% of industry and 75% of coal and iron reserves. Only a small minority of revolutionaries, led by Luxemburg and Liebknecht, remained internationalist and condemned the war from the beginning.

In spite of SPD support for the war effort the state eventually cracked apart. Imminent defeat and a mutiny by Kiel sailors initiated a revolution. The war also produced an imperialist peace - the Versailles treaty - in which the victors carved up the country taking 13% of its territory and 10% of its population.