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In March 1920 the Erhardt brigade, wearing swastikas and supported
by the prominent Reichswehr Generals Lüttwitz and Ludendorff, chased
the SPD-led government from Berlin. The putsch installed a retired
civil servant, Kapp, as the new Chancellor. (Three years later Ludendorff
would jointly lead the "Beer Hall putsch" with Hitler).
Kapp like Hitler, warned of the threat of "destruction and
violation by war-like Bolshevism." He too claimed his government
would "not be a one-sided capitalist one. It will rather save
German work from the hard fate of slavery to international big business...
In the best German tradition the State must stand above the conflict
of classes and parties, [although] striking is treason to the nation,
the Fatherland and the future." The seriousness of this ruling
class effort was underlined by the refusal of von Seekt, chief of
the Army High Command to lift a finger against Kapp. The army had
supported the republican government against the revolutionary left
and the militant workers, but now that the Freikorps had accomplished
its gruesome task, might it perhaps be safe to dispose of the SPD
too? Seekt was unsure of the answer and decided to bide his time
to see if Kapp could succeed. The same attitude prevailed in industry
where "the leading men of big business" proclaimed their
'neutrality', which amounted to according the new government parity
with the old. Only when the failure of the venture became evident
did they distance themselves from the putschists." The putsch
was defeated when the ADGB unions launched a massive general strike.
Not only was Kapp's government forced to resign, soon the workers'
offensive, which had been subdued by a year of Freikorps bloodletting,
resumed. Kapp's tactics had failed, but this did not rule out future
attempts under other leaders.
In Bavaria, however, the outcome was different. Only here did the
putsch succeed. During Kapp's brief rule a right-winger called Kahr
took over. When the putschists were finally swept away in Berlin
and elsewhere, Kahr remained in office. From this point on Bavaria
was even better disposed towards extreme right-wing groups, among
them the NSDAP.
The benefits to Nazism of this arrangement became evident in June
1922 after right-wing fanatics murdered Rathenau, the Foreign Minister
who was also Jewish. There was fury across Germany and the NSDAP
was banned in almost every state. Yet in Bavaria, where the Party's
activities continued unabated. Hitler enjoyed the "patronage"
of Munich's police chief and of Frick, head of its political department.
Links with the ruling class also went beyond this. Turner, who seeks
to minimise Nazism's connections with capitalism tells us that as
early as 1919 Hitler had been invited to Berlin's "National
Club" of army officers, senior civil servants and businessmen.
Meetings with the League of Bavarian Industrialists, the Herrenklub
and Merchants' Guild followed. By 1922 Hitler had the backing of
one of the most venerable firms of heavy industry - Borsig. The
Bechsteins (piano makers) and Bruckmann's, the publishers, were
also converts, along with Thyssen, giving Hitler a "respectability"
in polite society that "played an invaluable role".
Hitler's ambiguous position was illustrated by events surrounding
May Day, 1923. The NSDAP was planning to attack trade union demonstrations
in Munich. In order to do so Captain Röhm "borrowed"
a supply of arms from a barracks. This was going too far for the
military commander. While Hitler waited for the arms to arrive Röhm
"was standing to attention before an angry General von Lossow
and being reminded of his duty as a soldier." The fact that
Hitler almost acquired arms in this way shows that he was far from
an outsider to the establishment. However, the withholding of those
arms when they threatened to create an unpredictable civil war situation,
showed his strategy was not yet shared by everyone in these circles.
As 1923 wore on Germany was hit by the "Great Inflation".
It had many causes - the way the war effort had been financed, reparations,
invasion of the Ruhr by French and Belgian troops to enforce payment,
and finally the pressure of the great industrialists to withdraw
concessions made to labour. The impact on the economy was astonishing.
In January 1913 the exchange rate was one mark to the dollar, but
in 1923:
the mark plunged down, not from month to month, or from week
to week, but from day to day - indeed, hour to hour. On 13th November
1923 the dollar was quoted officially at 840 milliards, the day
after at 1,260 milliards, after another 24 hours at 2,520 milliards,
and, on 20th November, when the rate reached its maximum, at 4,200
milliards [or 4,200,000,000,000 marks].
The crisis swelled the fortunes of individuals like Stinnes to
obscene proportions. He bought up failed businesses on borrowed
money which instantly lost its value. For the rest of the population
life became far more difficult. Workers struggled to keep up with
price increases; a kilo of rye bread retailed at 0.29 marks in 1913
but cost 428,000,000,000 in November 1923. The average wage did
not provide half the subsistence needed for a family of four. Many
middle class people on pensions or with savings saw these wiped
out in value. While ruin was not universal, it is calculated that
by 1925 the total income of small investors was just 3-4% of its
pre-war sum.
What would be the outcome of this immense crisis? In the previous
four years the Kaiser's state largely remained intact. Denied a
radical solution to Germany's problems the middle class had swung
back to the right. However, in the midst of a capitalist system
apparently bent on self-destruction, the left was also growing.
The KPD had become a mass party. Even after the revolutionary wave
had passed, it still attracted 4 votes to every 6 of the SPD in
the 1924 election. Around Germany armed organisations called "Proletarian
Hundreds" were springing up and huge strikes swept the country.
In late 1923 revolution was clearly on the cards, a fact recognised
on all sides of the political spectrum. Accordingly the KPD planned
meticulously for an uprising. The spark was supposed to come from
a defence of the KPD-backed governments in Saxony and Thuringia.
The tense atmosphere was described by one Communist:
A silent, almost inconceivable drama. A million revolutionaries,
ready, awaiting the signal to attack: behind them the millions
of the unemployed, the hungry, the desperate, a people in pain,
murmuring, 'Us as well, us as well'. The muscles of this crowd
were ready, the first already clasping the Mausers that they were
going to oppose to the armoured cars of the Reichswehr.
Demands by the army to dissolve the Saxon and Thuringian governments
were supposed to have been the prelude to a general strike and revolt.
However, on 21 October 1923 the KPD backed off from issuing this
call. Only Hamburg, which did not receive the order to retreat rose
up.
There is no space here to discuss the reasons for this turnaround,
nor to speculate on the chances of success for a workers' revolution
in autumn 1923. But the perception on the right is relevant. Hitler
had witnessed the growth of the crisis, and the revolutionary mood
with growing anticipation. In 1922 Mussolini had been invited into
power after the March on Rome. This encouraged Hitler to attempt
the same thing in Germany. He trusted that the threat of proletarian
revolution in 1923 would bring him more determined ruling class
support than had been available to Kapp in 1920. Bavaria was selected
as the launching pad for a march through central Germany to wipe
out the Saxon and Thuringian governments. It would then continue
on to Berlin to take power.
In October the prospects for such an enterprise were good. At this
time there was an "unholy alliance between the Reichswehr and
the para-military" for at this time "over 50% of all stockpiles
and ammunition in Germany were owned, or seized by these groups.".
The Bavarian government had already come into conflict with the
central government in Berlin in September when the latter agreed
to fulfil reparations demands in order to win French and Belgian
withdrawal. Denouncing this as a betrayal of the national cause
a state of emergency was decreed in Bavaria, and State Commissioner
Kahr dared Berlin to do its worst. When Berlin tried to remove Lossow,
the head of the Bavarian Reichswehr, Kahr stepped in to block this
move. Together with Seisser, the state police chief, the three men
formed a dictatorship.
This did not necessarily mean the way was open for Hitler. Firstly,
differences existed between Kahr's government and the Nazis. The
former wanted either monarchical restoration or independence for
Bavaria and were not convinced that Bavaria could launch a successful
armed counter-revolution on a national scale. Such an attempt might
unleash a workers' movement even stronger than the one that had
toppled Kapp in 1920. Secondly, in Berlin von Seekt was still more
cautious. A right-wing coup would, he said, "unleash civil
war" which the workers might win.
Seekt's stance was based purely on a tactical estimate of the balance
of class forces rather than any belief in democracy or hatred of
Nazism. In 1923 Seekt himself was working on plans for a military
coup in which Stinnes would play a leading role. The latter wanted
a dictatorship which would demand 2 hours unpaid labour per day
and ban strikes. Later on, in 1930, Seekt was asked if the Nazis
should be in government and replied: "Yes indeed and I would
go further - it is a necessity".
Hitler's strategy depended on the backing of significant sections
of the establishment, especially in Bavaria. To attract this he
needed revolution as an immediate threat. He believed that Communist
"civil war" would crystallise support for a direct counter-attack:
"And there will be only two possibilities: either Berlin marches
and ends up in Munich, or Munich marches and ends up in Berlin!
A Bolshevist North Germany and a Nationalist Bavaria cannot exist
side by side." Hitler's scenario seemed to be unfolding in
October, when he was busy hatching his plans.
But the scrapping of the KPD-planned revolt threw Hitler's calculations
off course and drove him to desperate measures. On the evening of
8 November a meeting with Kahr in the Munich Beer Hall was surrounded
by Hitler's troops. The "Führer" leapt on to a chair
to announce the formation of a new government. This would be no
overthrow of the establishment. The government was to be headed
by the Kaiser's old war leader, Ludendorff. Kahr was to rule Bavaria;
Lossow would be Army Minister and Seisser Reich Police Minister.
By this time however, Kahr, Lossow and Seisser had got cold feet
and so it was only under duress that they promised to play their
allotted roles. As soon as they were out of Hitler's clutches they
rescinded their pledge, one influence being the telegram from Seekt
demanding an end to the putsch. The Nazis could not turn back now
and on 9 November marched through Munich. As they reached the centre
a police cordon blocked their passage. In the shooting that followed
16 Nazis were killed. This was the end of the "National Revolution".
It failed so pathetically because, as Hitler himself admitted: "We
never thought to carry through a revolt against the Army: it was
with it that we believed we should succeed."
CONCLUSION
Once again we are confronted with the fact that the Nazi leadership
was not some third force distinct from society but an extreme counter-revolutionary
wing. If there was any doubt of this it was dispelled by Hitler's
treason trial that followed the putsch. Unbelievably these were
the words of the State Prosecutor about the accused:
as a brave soldier [in the World War] he showed a German spirit,
and afterward, beginning from scratch and working hard, he created
a great party, the 'National Socialist German Workers' Party,
which is pledged to fighting international Marxism and Jewry,
to settling accounts with the November criminals, and to disseminating
the national idea among all layers of the population, in particular
the workers. I am not called to pass judgement on his party programme,
but his honest endeavour to reawaken the belief in the German
cause among an oppressed and disarmed people is most certainly
to his credit. Here, helped by his unique oratorical gift, he
has made a significant contribution.
Not surprisingly Hitler received the minimum sentence of five years,
a promise of early probation, and a prison "cell" that
looked "like a delicatessen store. You could have opened up
a flower and fruit and a wine shop with all the stuff stacked there."
Beloved of Munich salons and patronised by police chiefs and industrialists
the future Führer spent just over 8 months in jail. Five days after
his release this convicted criminal had a personal interview with
the Bavarian prime minister who kindly agreed to lift the ban on
his newspaper, the Völkischer Beobachter.
Although the immediate prospect of revolution receded after 1923,
Hitler had established his credentials as leader of a movement that
took organised counter-revolution seriously. This book will continue
to use the term "counter-revolutionary" as shorthand for
Nazi ideology even though there was a change in its practical meaning.
After 1923 the Nazi programme was one of destroying the potential
of revolution. In the mid-1920s there was little call for the NSDAP's
services, as the situation had apparently stabilised. The appearance
of calm was misleading.
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